Abstract-We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost functions, but also via constraints coupling their strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm that achieves an almostNash equilibrium by requiring only local communications of the agents, as specified by a sparse communication network. The proof of convergence of the algorithm relies on the auxiliary class of network aggregative games and exploits a novel result of parametric convergence of variational inequalities, which is applicable beyond the context of games. We apply our theoretical findings to a multi-market Cournot game with transportation costs and maximum market capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VERAGE aggregative games are used to describe populations of non-cooperative agents where each agent is not subject to one-to-one interactions with the others, but is rather influenced by the average strategy of the entire population. These games are gaining more and more attention in the control community for their ability to model a vast number of technological applications ranging from traffic [1] and wireless systems [2] to electricity [3] and commodity markets [4] .
Applying game theoretical concepts to engineering systems becomes challenging in presence of a large number of agents with private cost functions and constraints, willing to exchange information only with a (small) subset of the population. Moreover, often the agents' strategies must collectively satisfy some physical coupling constraints, as in electricity markets [5] , where the overall energy demand should not exceed the grid capacity, or in communication networks [6] , where the package traffic should not exceed the congestion level.
Main contributions
To overcome the difficulties described above, in this paper we present a distributed algorithm that guarantees convergence to an almost Nash equilibrium of a population average aggregative game with affine coupling constraints by using only local communications over a sparse network. Our method works for populations of heterogeneous agents with generic local convex constraints and generic convex cost functions (i.e. we do not need to assume that the cost functions are quadratic, as in [7] ). To prove algorithmic convergence we rely on two key steps: i) we show that the Nash equilibrium of the average aggregative game of interest can be approximated to any desired precision by the Nash equilibrium of an auxiliary network aggregative game (as defined in [8] ); ii) we propose a distributed algorithm to compute the Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game.
As a side contribution, to tackle i) we prove a result on convergence of parametric variational inequalities (VIs) which is applicable beyond the context of games. A detailed explanation of how our result improves the existing literature on convergence of parametric VIs is given in Appendix B. Moreover, to tackle ii), we derive a distributed algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium of any network aggregative game. Both these results can find application beyond the specific context of this paper and are thus of interest on their own.
To illustrate our theoretical findings, we study in detail a Cournot game with transportation costs, as introduced in [9, Section 1.4.3] . We note that such setup extends the Cournot game [10, Section 2] and the multi-market Cournot game [11, Section 7 .1] by introducing transportation costs. Our novel contributions consist in introducing coupling constraints, performing a specific study of the properties of a fundamental operator associated with the game, and focusing on distributed convergence.
Comparison with the literature
The problem of coordinating the agents to a Nash equilibrium is of great importance for control purposes and it has consequently been addressed by many authors in the last few years. In the following we review such rapidly growing literature by distinguishing whether the proposed algorithms 1) can only be applied when the agent strategy sets are decoupled or allow for constraints coupling the agents' strategies and 2) require a central coordinator (decentralized algorithms) or employ only local communications (distributed algorithms). We note that in some applications distributed algorithms are preferable to decentralized ones, for reasons of privacy, security or for the lack of a central operator.
A vast literature focused on the case of decoupled strategy sets, where the feasible strategy set of each agent is not affected by the strategies of the other agents. Decentralized algorithms relying on the presence of a central operator that can gather and broadcast information to the agents are suggested in [7] , [12] . On the other hand, distributed algorithms relying only on local communications among the agents are suggested in [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] .
All the previously mentioned algorithms cannot be applied to the case of coupling constraints, because they build on the core assumption that the strategy sets are decoupled. Consequently, including coupling constraints requires a fundamental rethinking of the algorithms suggested in the literature, as we highlight in detail in Section IV-C. A decentralized algorithm overcoming this issue for average aggregative games has been recently suggested in [17] , [18] , by exploiting a primaldual reformulation of the Nash equilibrium problem originally introduced for generic games in [19] and [20, Theorem 3.1] . To the best of our knowledge, the only distributed algorithm available in the literature for average aggregative games with coupling constraints is [21] . However such algorithm is only applicable if the coupling constraints can be expressed as the solution set of a system of linear equations [21, eq. (5) ]. This is a very restrictive assumption that prevents the applicability of the algorithm suggested in [21] to any of the practical cases discussed before.
We finally note that our work has some affinity with the distributed algorithms suggested in [11] , [22] , [23] to compute a Nash equilibrium of generic games (i.e., games that do not have the aggregative structure considered here) with coupling constraints. The term "distributed" in all these references, however, refers to the fact that any specific agent is only allowed to communicate with the agents that affect his cost function. In average aggregative games the cost function of each agent is affected by the strategy of all the other agents, because it is affected by the average population strategy. Consequently, the schemes proposed in [22] , [23] , [11] can theoretically be applied to average aggregative games, but they would require communications among all the agents.
The average aggregative game (AAG) considered in this paper also relates to the class of mean field games (MFGs), since both in AAGs and in MFGs the agents are influenced only by an aggregate of the population strategies [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] . There are however some fundamental differences that make results derived for MFGs not applicable in our context. Firstly, in MFGs the strategies of the agents are unconstrained: the coupling constraints that we consider here cannot be handled with the mean field approach based on partial differential equations. Secondly, MFG results are derived for the limit of infinite population size: we here instead consider populations of any size. Thirdly, in MFGs agents are typically homogeneous or have prior (probabilistic) information of the parameters of the other agents: we instead assume that the agents have no information on the rest of the population and rely on local communications over a network. Finally, MFGs are stochastic dynamic games while AAGs are deterministic static games.
Organization: In Section II we formulate the game setup, we present our main algorithm and we state our main result. In Section III we present some preliminary results, needed to prove our main theorem. The main result, stated in Section II, is proven in Sections IV-A and IV-B. Specifically, in Section IV-A we study the relation between the Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game (which is parametrized by ν ∈ N) and the Nash equilibrium of the original average aggregative game, which can be seen as the limiting game when ν → ∞. In Section IV-B we prove convergence of our algorithm to the Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game. Section V focuses on the application, while Section VI presents some some generalizations of the previous theory, which were omitted to keep the exposition simple, and future research directions. Appendix B is a standalone section containing the result on convergence of parametric VIs. Appendices A and C contain some auxiliary definitions and results, respectively. We report our main results as theorems, our auxiliary results as lemmas and auxiliary results that already exist in the literature as propositions.
Notation: ||x|| is the 2-norm of x ∈ R n . I n ∈ R n×n is the identity matrix, 1 n ∈ R n is the vector of unit entries, 0 n ∈ R n is the vector of zero entries, e i ∈ R n is the i th canonical basis vector. Given A ∈ R n×n , A 0 ( 0) ⇔ x Ax > 0 (≥ 0), ∀x = 0; A is the induced 2-norm of A. diag(A) is the diagonal matrix which has the same diagonal of A. blkdiag(A 1 , . . . , A N ) is the block diagonal matrix whose blocks are the matrices
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULT

A. Average aggregative games
Consider a population of N ∈ N agents, where agent i ∈ Z[1, N ] chooses his decision variable x i in his individual constraint set X i ⊆ R n , and interacts with the other agents via the average of their strategies. The aim of agent i is to minimize his cost function
We denote by
R N n and we assume that, besides the individual constraints, the agents have to satisfy a linear coupling constraint expressed on the average strategy
withÂ ∈ R m×n ,b ∈ R m , for some m > 0. The coupling constraints in (1) can model the fact that the usage level for a certain commodity cannot exceed a fixed capacity, as in [5] and in [17, Fig. 4 ]. The strong modeling flexibility of linear coupling constraints is further discussed in [11, Remark 3.1]. 1 The subscript ∞ does not refer to an infinite population, but to the fact that the agents interact through the exact average The cost and constraints just introduced give rise to the average aggregative game (AAG)
The following conditions on cost functions and constraints of G ∞ are assumed to hold throughout the rest of the paper.
Standing assumption. For each agent i, the individual constraint set X i ⊂ R n is convex, compact and has non-empty interior. The cost function
Let us denote Q ∞ := X ∩ C ∞ , and
The well-known concept of Nash equilibrium for games with coupling constraints [29] can be specialized to G ∞ as follows.
If (3) holds with ε = 0 thenx is a Nash equilibrium.
In words, a feasible set of strategies
is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can improve his cost by changing his strategy, if the strategies of the other agents are fixed. A Nash equilibrium for a game with coupling constraints is usually called a generalized Nash equilibrium to denote the fact that the set of feasible strategies Q i ∞ for each agent i depends on the strategies x −i of the other agents [29] ; in the following we omit the word generalized for brevity.
B. Communication limitations
Our main objective is to coordinate the agents' strategies to a Nash equilibrium by using a distributed algorithm that only requires communications over a pre-specified (sparse) communication network. We model such network by its adjacency matrix T ∈ [0, 1] N ×N , where the element T ij ∈ [0, 1] is the weight that agent i assigns to communications received from agent j, with T ij = 0 representing no communication. For brevity, we refer to T as communication network, even though it is the adjacency matrix of the communication network. Agent j is an in-neighbor of i if T ij > 0 and an out-neighbor if T ji > 0. We denote the sets of in-and out-neighbors of agent i as N The definitions of primitive and doubly-stochastic can be found in [30] , where graph theoretical conditions guaranteeing Assumption 1 are also presented. Loosely speaking, Assumption 1 ensures that if the agents communicate a sufficiently large number of times over T , they are able to recover the average of the strategies across the entire population. To overcome the fact that the communication network is sparse we assume that to compute σ i ν,(k) and µ i ν,(k) the agents communicate not once but multiple times over the network T . The number of communications per update is denoted by ν ∈ N and is a tuning parameter of the algorithm. The personal strategy (or primal variable) and the dual variable, in turn, are updated by a gradient-like step that depends on a second tuning parameter τ > 0. In particular, the strategy update step is similar to that of the standard projection algorithm [9, Algorithm 12.1.1]. We finally note that both tuning parameters ν and τ are decided a priori and do not change during the algorithm execution. 
The main objective of the paper is to prove convergence of Algorithm 1 to an ε ν -Nash equilibrium of G ∞ , where ε ν → 0 as ν → ∞. To this end, we make use of the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Coupling constraints).
The matrixÂ and the vectorb in (1) are such that the following implication holds.
It can be shown that if the coupling constraint (1) consists of an upper and a lower bound for σ ∞ (x), i.e. it is of the form b 1 ≤ σ ∞ (x) ≤ b 2 , with b 1 < b 2 , then Assumption 2 is satisfied. We show in the application Section V another example of coupling constraint satisfying Assumption 2.
Assumption 3 (Regularity of cost functions). The operator
is strongly monotone. Further, the cost function
We recall in the following the definition of strong monotonicity.
Definition 2 (Strong monotonicity). An operator
We note that sufficient conditions for Assumption 3 to hold have been discussed in [18, Lemmas 3 and 4, Corollaries 1 and 2] for specific instances of average aggregative games.
Our main result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then for every precision ε > 0, there exists a minimum number of communications ν ε > 0 such that, for every ν > ν ε and for every initial condition (
produced by Algorithm 1 converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium of G ∞ for τ small enough.
A precise bound on τ is given in Theorem 3 in Section IV-B.
III. AUXILIARY RESULTS
In this section we present some preliminary results needed for the proof of Theorem 1, whose main idea consists in defining an auxiliary game G ν parametric in the number of communications ν and showing that 1) Algorithm 1 converges to a specific Nash equilibrium of G ν , called variational equilibrium; 2) the variational Nash equilibrium of G ν is an ε ν -Nash equilibrium of G ∞ , with ε ν → 0 as ν → ∞. To prep the field for these two results, which are proven in Section IV, we here define the game G ν , introduce some basic results from the theory of variational inequalities (VI) and study the relation between the VI operators associated with the two games G ∞ and G ν .
A. Multi-communication network aggregative games
In each iteration of Algorithm 1 the agents need to communicate ν times over T ; mathematically this is equivalent to communicating once over a fictitious network with adjacency matrix T ν . Based on T ν , we introduce the local averages
We define G ν as a game with same constraints and cost functions as in G ∞ except for the fact that each agent reacts to the local average σ i ν (x) instead of the global average σ ∞ (x). Specifically, upon defining
we formally introduce the multi-communication network aggregative game as
The definition of Nash equilibrium for G ν is the analogous of Definition 1 for G ∞ . To analyze the relation between G ∞ and G ν we use the framework of variational inequalities introduced next.
B. Basics of variational inequalities
A fundamental fact used throughout the rest of the paper is that a specific class of Nash equilibria of any convex game, called variational Nash equilibria, can be obtained by solving a variational inequality constructed from the game primitives.
Definition 3 (Variational inequality). Given a set K ⊆ R
n and an operator H : K → R n , the pointx ∈ R n is a solution of
A discussion on how variational inequalities generalize convex optimization programs can be found in [9, Section 1.3.1]. In the following we report a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the solution of a variational inequality.
. Consider a closed and convex set K and a strongly monotone operator H : K → R n . Then VI(K,H) admits a unique solution.
The following lemma gives a more intuitive characterization of the strong monotonicity property.
Proposition 2 ([9, Proposition 2.3.2]).
A continuously differentiable operator H : K ⊆ R n → R n is strongly monotone with monotonicity constant α if and only if ∇ x H(x) αI n for all x ∈ K.
C. Variational Nash equilibria
To draw the connection between VIs and Nash equilibria, let us introduce the following quantities relative to G ν
and recall the corresponding quantities relative to G ∞
The operator in (7a) is the same as (5) in Assumption 3 and in (7) the coupling constraint C ∞ is expressed in the redundant form A ∞ x ≤ b (consisting of N repetitions of the constraint Aσ ∞ (x) ≤b) to match the structure of A ν x ≤ b in (6).
In the following we specialize a well-known result of [20, Theorem 2.1] to the two games G ∞ and G ν .
Due to the presence of the coupling constraints the converse of Proposition 3 does not hold. In other words, there can be Nash equilibria of G ∞ (resp. G ν ) that cannot be obtained as solutions of VI(Q ∞ ,F ∞ ) (resp. VI(Q ν ,F ν )). Within the class of Nash equilibria, variational Nash equilibria enjoy special stability and sensitivity properties [29] . Variational equilibria are also a subset of the normalized equilibria defined in [19] , which are in most cases the only Nash equilibria that can be computed. Variational equilibria can be interpreted as the most fair within the class of normalized equilibria, because the burden of meeting the coupling constraints is divided equally among all the agents [20, Theorem 3.1].
We conclude by stating convergence of the operator F ν to F ∞ as ν tends to infinity.
uniformly in x. The operators F ν are bounded on X , uniformly in ν.
Proof: The fact that Theorem 2] . Convergence of A ν to A ∞ follows immediately from the definitions (6d), (7d) and the properties of the Kronecker product. Note that
and for all ν > 0, since T and thus T ν are non-negative and doubly stochastic. Then for all x ∈ X
which proves that F ν is bounded, uniformly in ν.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We divide the proof of Theorem 1 into two parts. 1) In subsection IV-A we show thatx ν →x ∞ as ν → ∞ and thatx ν is an ε ν -Nash equilibrium for G ∞ , with ε ν → 0 as ν → ∞. To this end we exploit a novel result on parametric convergence of variational inequalities, which is derived in Appendix B. 2) In subsection IV-B we show that Algorithm 1 converges tox ν . From these two results it follows that, for any desired ε one can guarantee that the limit pointx ν of Algorithm 1 is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G ∞ , by setting a number ν of communications large enough. This proves Theorem 1.
A. Convergence of the variational Nash equilibrium of G ν to the variational Nash equilibrium of G ∞
The next lemma provides a sufficient condition for F ν to be strongly monotone, which is then used in Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. If Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, there exists ν SMON such that F ν is strongly monotone for all ν > ν SMON .
We report the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix C. Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then 1) The game G ∞ has a unique variational Nash equilibrium x ∞ and for any ν > ν SMON , G ν has a unique variational Nash equilibriumx ν . Moreover,
2) For every ε > 0, there exists a ν ε > ν SMON such that, for every ν > ν ε , the variational Nash equilibriumx ν of G ν is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G ∞ .
Proof: 1) Existence and uniqueness ofx ∞ andx ν solutions to VI(Q ∞ ,F ∞ ) and VI(Q ν ,F ν ) respectively is guaranteed by Proposition 1, because the operator F ∞ is strongly monotone by Assumption 3 and the operator F ν (for ν > ν SMON ) is strongly monotone by Lemma 2. By Proposition 2, strong monotonicity of F ν implies convexity of
. Consequently, Proposition 3 guarantees thatx ∞ andx ν are the unique variational Nash equilibrium of G ∞ and G ν , respectively. To show (8), we use Theorem B.1 in Appendix B, which is a general result on convergence of parametric variational inequalities. The theorem is based on Assumption B.1 in Appendix B.
To verify such assumption note that by Lemma 
Moreover, in our setup (27) reads as
To prove (9) take s :
By Assumption 2, we concludeŝ = 0. Since s ≥ 0, it must be s = 0 thus proving (9) .
2) We divide the proof of this statement into two parts: i) we prove thatx ν ∈ Q ∞ for any ν > 0, and ii) we prove that condition (3) 
However,
where the second to last equality holds because, by Assumption 1, T is doubly stochastic and so is T ν . By substituting (11) into (10) we obtainÂσ ∞ (x ν ) ≤b, thusx ν ∈ Q ∞ for any ν. ii) Sincex ν is a Nash equilibrium for G ν , for all i ∈ Z[1, N ] and for all
ν ), for all ν > ν 1 . The last inequality in (13) can be proven with a chain of inequalities similar to the previous ones in (13) . Condition (13) 
ν ), as we used the fact thatx ν is a Nash equilibrium for G ν . Since we however want to prove thatx ν is an ε-Nash for G ∞ , we need to prove that (3) holds for all
Since we showed in the first statement thatx ν →x ∞ , by Lemma C.1 in Appendix C, there exists 2 ν 2 > ν SMON such that for all ν > ν 2 and all i ∈ Z[1, N ] there existsx
Then for every initial condition (
produced by Algorithm 1 converges to the unique variational Nash equilibrium of G ν .
Proof: Let us define
. Then the communication steps are equivalent to
Consequently, the update steps can be rewritten as
for all i ∈ Z[1, N ] or, in compact form,
As (16) coincides with one iteration of the asymmetric projection algorithm given in [18, Algorithm 2] applied to VI(Q ν , F ν ). Then [18, Theorem 3] shows that, by choosing τ as in (15) , which also implies τ < 1/ A ν , Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to the unique solution of VI(Q ν , F ν ).
Under Assumption 1, T ν = 1 since T is doubly stochastic. Hence in this case, one can use Â instead of A ν in (15). Moreover, Lemma 2 guarantees that strong monotonicity of F ν assumed in Theorem 3 is met for ν > ν SMON .
C. Relation of Theorems 2 and 3 with the literature on distributed convergence in AAG without coupling constraints
As anticipated in the introduction, distributed algorithms for AAGs without coupling constraints have already been derived in the literature, for example in [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . We highlight here how the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 and the steps of Algorithm 1 greatly simplify in the absence of coupling constraints (i.e. when C ∞ = R N n ). Regarding the first statement of Theorem 2, in the absence of coupling constraints the VIs of G ν and G ∞ feature the same set X , which is not affected by the parameter ν. Convergence ofx ν tox ∞ can thus be proven by using standard sensitivity analysis results for VI, as explained in details at the beginning of Appendix B. In this case one can even prove Lipschitz continuity of the solution, so it is possible to derive bounds on the minimum number of communications ν needed to achieve any desired precision in (8) .
Regarding the second statement of Theorem 2, in the absence of coupling constraints the fact thatx ν is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G ∞ is a trivial consequence of (8) and of the fact that the cost functions are Lipschitz. The difficulty when introducing the coupling constraints are that i) the feasibility ofx ν in G ν does not imply automatically feasibility ofx ν in G ∞ and ii) in the definition of Nash equilibrium, the set of feasible deviations Q Regarding Algorithm 1 and Theorem 3, in the absence of coupling constraints one needs to solve the VI(X , F ν ) in a distributed fashion. Since the constraint set X can be decoupled among the agents, the standard projection algorithm [9, Algorithm 12.1.1] is distributed and it is guaranteed to converge, because F ν is strongly monotone. In other words, one can run Algorithm 1 performing only the primal steps, with simplified strategy update
V. APPLICATION: COURNOT GAME WITH TRANSPORTATION COSTS
A. Game definition
Consider a single-commodity 3 Cournot game with N firms and V markets, which correspond to V physical locations. Firm i ∈ Z[1, N ] chooses to sell y i v ∈ R ≥0 amount of commodity at each market v ∈ Z[1, V ]. Each firm i produces its commodity at a given location i ∈ Z[1, V ] and then ships its commodity to the different markets over a transportation network, where the V nodes represent market locations and a directed edge connecting two nodes represents a road connecting two markets. We characterize the network by its incidence matrix B ∈ {0, 1, −1}
V ×E , where E is the number of edges and B v,e = −1 if edge e leaves node v, B v,e = 1 if edge e enters node v and B v,e = 0 otherwise. Denote by r i ∈ R ≥0 the total amount of commodity produced and sold by firm i (i.e., r i = v∈V y , due to the balance equation
with H i := [B, e i ] ∈ R V×(E+1) and e j the j th canonical vector. 1) Cost function: We assume that at each market the commodity is sold at a price that depends on the total commodity sold by the N firms. We allow for intermarket effects and use the inverse demand function 4 p : 
where, for all i, γ i e is a strongly concave, increasing function with maximum derivative smaller than β i e . The transportation cost in (17) can be thought of as the sum of two terms: the first is a cost proportional to the amount shipped, the second term is a discount that increases as the amount of shipped commodity increases.
The production cost function of firm i has a similar form
where γ i a is a strongly concave, increasing function with maximum derivative smaller than β i a . Note that the functions (17) and (18) To sum up, the cost function of firm i is
2) Constraints: The strategy of firm i must satisfy the individual constraints
wherer i is the production capacity of firm i. Note that (19) implies t i e ≤r i for each e, which is needed to guarantee boundedness of X i and can be imposed without loss of generality, as the transportation costs c i e are increasing. Moreover, we assume that each market v is composed by retailers whose storage capacity imposes an upper bound K v on the total commodity that can be sold at market v, thus giving rise to the coupling constraints
3) Communication network: We assume that the firms can communicate with each other according to a sparse communication network, described by the adjacency matrix T , which we assume satisfies Assumption 1. This network can model spatial proximity of firms, or the fact that they may want to share their strategies only with firms they trust.
B. Theoretical guarantees
The cost, constraints and communication network introduced above give rise to a game as in (2), with the only difference that the aggregate σ ∞ (x) depends on
directly. We next show that our theory can be easily extended to cover such case.
The quantities in (7) relative to G ∞ are
The quantities in (6) relative to G ν are
The only assumption of Sections II-III that needs to be modified is Assumption 2, which, due to the presence of H blkd in (20c), cannot be expressed on the soleÂ andb and is hence replaced by the following one.
Assumption 2' (Coupling constraints). The matrix A ∞ in (20c) and the vector b in (20d) are such that the following implication holds.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, which made use of Assumption 2, can be conducted in the same way using Assumption 2'.
2) Verify the assumptions: To use Theorem 1 in the numerical analysis of the next subsection, we need to verify its assumptions. Assumption 1 holds by problem statement. Assumption 2' is satisfied, because the implication {(1 N ⊗ K) s ≤ 0, s ≥ 0} ⇒ s = 0 is satisfied, given that K > 0. To guarantee that Assumption 3 holds we make the following assumption, whose sufficiency is proven in Lemma 3.
Assumption 4 (Cournot-game regularity conditions). The cost J i (z 1 , z 2 ) is twice continuously differentiable for all i, and the inverse demand function p satisfies one of the following conditions. 5 Defining a new game with strategiesx i = H i x i , so that the aggregate depends only on thex i , is not possible in general as the cost J i (x i , σ∞(x)) cannot be expressed as a function of the variablesx i s unless H i is full column rank for all i. This is not the case in the Cournot game under consideration. The proof is reported in Appendix C. Regarding the Standing Assumption, Assumption 3 implies that J i is continuously differentiable in its arguments and that
αI N (E+1) by Proposition 2, which in turn implies
, which implies convexity of J i in x i for all fixed x −i . The sets X i are trivially convex, compact and non-empty.
Finally, the next lemma shows that for the network, number of communications ν and price functions used in the numerical analysis of the next subsection, F ν is strongly monotone, as required by Theorem 3.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 4.1), if T is the adjacency matrix of an undirected network, so that T = T , then the operator F ν is strongly monotone for any ν even.
The proof is reported in Appendix C.
C. Numerical analysis
We consider two simulation setups. The first is a small example to develop intuition about the problem, the second is used to illustrate the applicability of our method for a more realistic scenario.
1) Small network:
We consider a simple chain transportation network with V = 5 markets, E = 4 roads and N = 3 firms. As illustrated in Figure 1 we assume that the firms {1, 2, 3} are located at markets {1, 3, 5}, respectively, and are otherwise identical, withr i = 5 for all i. 
For each market v, we consider the inverse demand function p v to be affine and independent from the commodity sold at other markets. Specifically, for all v, p v (σ) = 10 − σ v . We assume that firm 2 bidirectionally communicates with firms 1 and 3, while 1 and 3 do not communicate, according to the communication matrix
which is primitive and doubly stochastic, hence satisfies Assumption 1.
We run Algorithm 1 with τ = 0.005, ν = 10 and initial conditions all equal to zero 6 . We use max{
−4 as stopping criterion. Figure 2 (top) reports the sales y i for each firm in the 5 markets at the variational Nash equilibrium of G ν (with ν = 10), for the case when there are no coupling constraints (i.e., K is chosen so large that it has no effect). Figure 2 (bottom) reports how the equilibrium changes if we introduce the coupling constraint [σ ∞ (x)] 3 ≤ 1/3, so that the total capacity of market 3 is 1. In both cases the G ν (with ν = 10) variational equilibrium is an ε ν -Nash equilibrium for G ∞ , as by the second statement of Theorem 2. The value of ε ν can be computed after convergence according to Definition 1. A more descriptive quantity is the relative maximum improvementε ν , defined as
which equals 0.0014 (for the game without coupling constraint) and 0.0035 (for the game with coupling constraint).
2) Large network: As a more realistic example we consider the transportation network illustrated in Figure 4 which consists of V = 43 possible markets and E = 51 (bidirectional) edges connecting them. The network is taken from the data set [32] , which provides also the Cartesian coordinates of the vertexes. We consider 5 firms that differ only for their locations i , which are 1 = 37, 2 = 20, 3 = 11, 4 = 6, 5 = 35 as indicated in Figure 4 . Each firm has a production capacity ofr i = 10, while we consider a capacity of 1.5 for each market (i.e. K = 1.5/5). The production cost is as in (23b) while the transportation cost for edge e is the same for each firm i and is 6 The values in (15) can be shown to be αν = 4/(1 +r) 3 
.9124 and Aν = 1; then (15) reads τ < 1.8 · 10 −4 . This is a conservative bound, we verified by simulations that the algorithm converges also for τ = 0.005. 7 Note that for any fixedxν ,εν in (24) can be computed by solving the N optimization problems {min x i ∈Q i where ρ e ∈]0, 1] is the normalized 8 length of road e. The inverse demand function p is affine, i.e. p(σ) = 10 · 1 45 ] h,k = 0 otherwise. In words, the price p v at market v not only decreases when more commodity is sold at v, but also when more commodity is sold at the neighboring markets, with physically close markets being more influential. We verified numerically that D 0. We use the communication matrix T that corresponds to a symmetric ring, i.e., As for the small network, we use max{
−4 as stopping criterion. We consider even values of ν between 2 and 20. For each ν we run Algorithm 1 and find the variational Nash equilibrium of G ν , which is an ε ν -Nash equilibrium for G ∞ , as by the second statement of Theorem 2. After convergence ε ν can be computed according to Definition 1 andε ν according to (24) . Figure 3 (top) reports the value ofε ν as function of ν, thus numerically verifying the second statement of Theorem 2. Figure 3 (bottom) reports the value of x ν −x ∞ 2 as function of ν, thus numerically verifying the first statement (8) of Theorem 2. In Figure 4 we illustrate the variational Nash equilibrium of G ∞ obtained by setting ν = 1 and T = 1 N 1 N 1 N . We note that each firm is the only seller at the location where it produces, and more in general firms tend to sell close to their production location, as expected. 8 The normalized length of a road is defined as the absolute length divided by the maximum length road in the network. 9 The values in (15) can be shown to be αν = 4/(1 +r) 3 = 0.003,
.89 and Aν = 1; then (15) reads τ < 1.8 · 10 −5 . This is a conservative bound, we verified by simulations that the algorithm converges also for τ = 0.05. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we derived an algorithm to steer the strategies of competitive agents to an almost Nash equilibrium for any average aggregative game i) by using only distributed communications and ii) in the presence of affine coupling constraints expressed on the average population strategy. The agents synchronously update their strategies and communicate a fixed number ν of times with their in-neighbors and outneighbors between two strategy updates. Our findings are based on a novel convergence result for parametric VI, which is of independent interest.
In the following subsections, we briefly comment on some immediate generalizations of the results above, that were omitted to keep the exposition simple, and on possible future works.
A. Immediate generalizations 1) Distributed algorithm for network aggregative games: Algorithm 1 is used here to find an ε-Nash of G ∞ . However, if we assume that F ν in (6a) is strongly monotone when ν = 1, then Algorithm 1 can be used to find the variational Nash equilibrium of any network aggregative game, as defined in [8] with network T , by setting ν = 1. Algorithm 1 thus constitutes an alternative to the distributed algorithms derived for generic games in [11] , [22] . Moreover, note that if we set T = 1 N 1 N 1 N and ν = 1 then Algorithm 1 achieves the variational Nash equilibrium of G ∞ , but communications among all agents are required.
2) Weighted average: The above results can be immediately generalized to aggregative games that depend on a weighted average of the population strategies
i used above. We can impose i w i = 1 without loss of generality. Then Assumption 1 can be modified to require T to be a primitive matrix with w > 0 as left eigenvector relative to the eigenvalue 1 (normalized such that w 1 N = 1).
3) Local strategy sets of different dimensions: In the previous sections we have assumed that the strategy set of each agent has n components, i.e, X i ⊂ R n . Following the same arguments as in Section V-B1), our results can be generalized to the case in which each agent features a strategy set of different dimension, i.e, X i ⊂ R ni , as in [10] , [11] and the aggregate strategy is σ
4) Wardrop instead of Nash equilibrium:
The focus of this paper is on Nash equilibrium, but the setup and the results extend to another important concept in game theory, namely the Wardrop equilibrium as defined in [18, Definition 2] , often used in transportation with the name of traffic equilibrium [33] and economics with the name of competitive equilibrium [34] . If in the primal update of Algorithm 1 we use
) (neglecting thus the second summand) then Algorithm 1 converges to a Wardrop equilibrium.
B. Future directions
There are a number of research directions that can be investigated as future work. Firstly, in our algorithm the agents communicate over a fixed network T . It would be valuable to extend our results to the case of time-varying or state-varying communication networks. It may also be interesting to relax the assumption of synchronous updates. Moreover, the result on convergence of parametric VI could be extended to the case of continuous parameters and to establish Lipschitz continuity of the solution. The latter would be valuable to derive bounds on the number of communications ν needed to approximate the Nash equilibrium with any desired precision. To the best of our knowledge, the only results guaranteeing Lipschitz continuity require the linear independence constraint qualification. Finally, as for all distributed communication schemes, it would be important to assess the algorithm performance in the presence of delay and packet loss. 
and ν k is a subsequence of N.
Note that lim inf S ν ⊆ lim sup S ν by definition. Condition (25) requires the opposite inclusion to hold.
Definition 5 (Hausdorff convergence of sets [35, p. 22] ). The Hausdorff distance between two non-empty subsets R and S of R n is defined as
We point out that Hausdorff set convergence (Definition 5) is in general stronger than Kuratowski set convergence (Definition 4) as shown in Theorems 2 and 3 of [35] .
B. A convergence result for parametric variational inequalities
The notation used in this section is disjoint from the rest of the paper. We study the convergence of the solutionx θ of VI(Q θ , F θ ) to the solutionxθ of VI(Qθ, Fθ) when θ →θ and both the set and the operator are affected by the parameter θ. In the literature on convergence of solutions of parametric variational inequalities it is common to assume that Fθ is strongly monotone and that F θ converges uniformly to Fθ as θ →θ. Besides that, the literature on the topic can be divided into three classes, based on the assumptions on the sets.
1) The first class of results focuses on sets that do not change, so that only the operator is affected by the parameter, and studies convergence of the solutionx θ of VI(Q, F θ ) to the solutionxθ of VI(Q, Fθ). If the set Q is closed and convex, F θ is Lipschitz in θ uniformly in x and Fθ is strongly monotone, then the solution is Lipschitz continuous [36, Theorem 1.14], [9, Section 5.3] . Strong monotonicity of Fθ can be relaxed if the set Q is a polyhedron [37] .
2) The second class of results [38] , [39] , [40] focuses on parametric sets that can be described as Q θ := {x ∈ R n | g(x, θ) ≤ 0} for a suitable parametric function g(x, θ). Assuming that g(x, θ) converges uniformly in x to g(x,θ) as θ →θ and that atxθ the linear independence constraint qualification holds, it can be shown that the parametric solution x θ is locally Lipschitz continuous aroundθ. Such results have been applied to games, as for example in [41] , [42] .
3) The third class of results [40] , [43] is the most general and only assumes that Q θ converges to Qθ according to the Kuratowski set convergence definition. In this case one can prove continuity ofx θ aroundθ. We are not aware of results proving local Lipschitz continuity in this case.
Here we do not assume the linear independence constraint qualification, because this is difficult to guarantee a priori for G ∞ . Instead, we focus on a specific form of the sets and prove convergence in Kuratowski as well as Hausdorff distance. We then exploit the results of [40] , [43] to show continuity of the VI solution. It is important to highlight that we do not consider a continuous parameter θ tending toθ, but we rather focus on the slightly less general case of a discrete parameter ν ∈ N that tends to infinity, since this is what is needed in Theorem 2. Specifically, we consider sets Q ν and Q ∞ that take the form
with X convex and compact, A ν , A ∞ ∈ R m×n , b ν , b ∞ ∈ R m , and consider operators F ν : X → R n , F ∞ : X → R n . Our result can also be interpreted as an extension of [44] , [45] on parametric quadratic programs, and of [37] , [46] on parametric variational inequalities over polyhedral sets, in that we consider sets that are obtained as the intersection of a parametric polyhedron with a generic convex and compact set X . Finally, we note that the parameter appears also in the matrix A ν and not only in b ν , as in [46] , [47] , [48] . The following assumption summarizes the specifics of our setup.
Assumption B.1. Suppose that a) The set X ⊂ R n is convex, compact and has non-empty interior. Moreover, lim ν→∞ A ν = A ∞ , lim ν→∞ b ν = b ∞ and
b) The operator F ∞ : X → R n is continuous, strongly monotone and there exists ν SMON > 0 such that F ν : X → R n is continuous, strongly monotone for each ν > ν SMON . For each x ∈ X , lim ν→∞ F ν (x) = F ∞ (x).
We note here that (27) is less restrictive than the assumption that A ∞ has full row rank (i.e., A ∞ s = 0 ⇒ s = 0), which is usually imposed to guarantee the linear independence constraint qualification a priori, see for example [40, Remark 2.2] .
The next Lemma B.1 proves Kuratowski and Hausdorff convergence of the sets. Kuratowski convergence of Q ν → Q ∞ is a key part of the proof of Theorem B.1. The fact that d H (Q ν , Q ∞ ) → 0 is instead used in Lemma C.1 of Appendix C, which is needed for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma B.1. If Assumption B.1a holds then as ν → ∞ we have
Conversely, we show S ∞ ⊆ lim inf S ν . Consider an arbitrarŷ x ∈ S ∞ , to show thatx ∈ lim inf S ν one needs to construct a sequence (x ν ) ∞ ν=1 with x ν ∈ S ν and such that x ν →x. To this end, defineÃ :
be the projection ofx ontoS(t) := {x ∈ R n |Ã(t)x ≤b(t)}. Assumption B.1a implies that the regularity conditions required by [44, Theorem 2.2] are met, hencex(t) is continuous at t = 0, that isx
Consider now the sequence (x ν :=x(1/ν)) ∞ ν=1 . Clearly x ν ∈ S(1/ν) = S ν and lim ν→∞ x ν =x, thus proving thatx ∈ lim inf S ν . We have thus shown that S ν → S ∞ . Since Q ν = S ν ∩ X and Q ∞ = S ∞ ∩ X , X is closed and convex with non-empty interior and S ν is closed and convex for all ν, by [43, Lemma 1.4] we have that Q ν → Q ∞ .
To conclude, since Q ν are closed subsets of R n for all ν and Q ∞ is compact and non-empty, using [35, Theorem 3] we obtain that Q ν → Q ∞ implies d H (Q ν , Q ∞ ) → 0, thus completing the proof.
We use Lemma B.1 and [43, Theorem A(b)] to show that the solution of VI(Q ν , F ν ) converges to the solution of VI(Q ∞ , F ∞ ).
Theorem B.1. If Assumption B.1 holds then VI(Q ∞ , F ∞ ) has a unique solutionx ∞ and, for ν > ν SMON , VI(Q ν , F ν ) has a unique solutionx ν . Moreover
Proof: The fact that VI(Q ∞ , F ∞ ) and VI(Q ν , F ν ) (for ν > ν SMON ) have a unique solution is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. To prove convergence we apply [43, Theorem A(b) ] to the sequence (VI(Q ν , F ν )) ∞ ν=1
and to VI(Q ∞ , F ∞ ). All the assumptions of [43, Theorem A(b) ] are direct consequences of Assumption B.1, except for Q ν → Q ∞ , which is proven in Lemma B.1. We can conclude thatx ν →x ∞ .
C. Auxiliary result and omitted proofs
The following Lemma C.1 is used in the proof of Theorem 2, but it is reported here for ease of readability, as it uses the definitions of Appendix A and Lemma B.1 of Appendix B. ν ) satisfy (27) and hence Assumption B.1a, so the conclusion follows by Lemma B.1.
2) It can be proven similarly as the previous one. Note that the value ofν used in the proof might depend onÂ,b,x, but not on x ν . This comes from proving the statement in two steps instead of applying Lemma B.1 directly to Q 
Proof of Lemma 2
Observe that (F ν (x) − F ν (y)) (x − y) = (F ∞ (x) − F ∞ (y)) (x − y)+
where ν is the Lipschitz constant of F ν − F ∞ (recall that J i are twice continuously differentiable. As J i (z 1 , z 2 ) is twicecontinuously differentiable in z 1 , z 2 and σ ν (x) → σ ∞ (x) uniformly in x, then ∇ x (F ν (x) − F ∞ (x)) → 0 uniformly in x and hence ν → 0, thus concluding the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3
We start by computing the operator F ∞ (x). We now prove that ∇ x P (x) 0 under either of the two conditions stated. 1) We have
) and H blkd = blkdiag(H 1 , . . . , H N ) . Moreover, since D 0, then
2) LetP 
We have proven that ∇ x F ∞ (x) αI N (E+1) for all x. Consequently, F ∞ is strongly monotone by Proposition 2 and the first statement of Assumption 3 holds. The second statement in Assumption 3 can be proven by using Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
The expression of F ν (x) is very similar to F ∞ (x) in Lemma 3
where
. Since F ν is continuously differentiable, we can prove its strong monotonicity by showing that there exists α > 0 such that ∇ x F ν (x) αI N (E+1) , thanks to Proposition 2. As in Lemma 3, there 
